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Abstract 
We study the relation between conjugal family ties and corruption, as well as 
the important role of this relation for the cultural transmission of preferences 
regarding the strength of family ties. We show that the impact of family ties 
on the level of corruption, which can be either positive or negative, feeds back 
into the very process through which preferences for family ties are diffused 
from the older to the younger generations. As a result, the relation between 
family ties and corruption sets in motion mechanisms that govern the 
dynamics of cultural transmission. These dynamics determine long-term 
outcomes in terms of the population’s cultural homogeneity or diversity with 
regard to their attitudes towards family ties. 
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1 Introduction 
The view that economic performance and the prevailing culture are inherently linked 
dates back to the 19th century and the ideas proposed by philosophers such as Max 
Weber and Karl Marx: The former argued that cultural change is a significant factor for 
economic outcomes, whereas the latter advocated the materialist view that cultural 
characteristics are mere by-products of the prevailing economic conditions. More recent 
years, however, have witnessed a rekindling of economists’ interest on issues pertaining 
to the intersection between cultural change and economic performance, as this is evident 
from the number of theoretical and empirical studies that explore such themes (e.g., 
Bisin and Verdier 2000, 2001; Hauk and Sáez-Martí 2002; Manz et al. 2006; Doepke and 
Zilibotti 2008, 2017; Tabellini 2010; Michau 2013; Chakraborty et al. 2016; Varvarigos 
2020). 
 A cultural aspect that has attracted increasing attention involves the strength of 
family ties. Taking account of the family’s role as a primary unit of social organisation as 
well as a key medium of socialisation, instruction and indoctrination, it is not difficult to 
understand the appeal of family ties as a prominent cultural characteristic. Naturally, 
the sense of family values and the bonding among family members can be pertinent to 
several aspects of people’s decision making – including decisions that have economic 
implications. Indeed, several studies have established a link between family ties – either 
conjugal (i.e., nuclear) or extended ones – and education (Duranton et al. 2009); economic 
development (Enke 2019); the labour market (Alesina et al. 2015); economic reform 
(Brumm and Brumm 2017); cooperative behaviour (Enke 2019); and political 
participation (Alesina and Giuliano 2011).     
 In this paper we focus on the relation between conjugal family ties and 
corruption, and study the implications of this relation for the intergenerational 
transmission process that determines the adoption of preferences regarding the strength 
of family ties. The motivation for our choice to investigate the dynamic implications of 
the family ties-corruption nexus is twofold: Firstly, corruption has several repercussions 
such as distorting the rule of law, discouraging private investment, inflating the cost of 
public investment, and shifting public infrastructure away from areas such as health and 
education – so much so that the World Bank classifies corruption “among the greatest 
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obstacles to economic and social development”.1 Secondly, the existing literature presents 
evidence on the relation between family ties and corruption, albeit ambiguous on its 
sign. Specifically, Marè et al. (2016) report that family ties increase corruption, whereas 
Ljunge (2015) and Litina and Varvarigos (2018) find that stronger family ties attenuate 
the level of corruption.  
 Our basis is the model of Litina and Varvarigos (2018) which, in turn, draws on 
the model of Alesina et al. (2015) – the aspects of locational preference, depending on the 
strength of conjugal family ties, and its implications for productivity – and enriches it 
with public employment, which is the source of corruption. In accordance with the 
existing evidence, the model shows that the effect of family ties on the level of 
corruption is ambiguous – it can be either positive or negative. In this study we enrich 
this model even further, by introducing dynamics through an explicit cultural 
transmission process whereby parents who have preferences for strong family ties try to 
inculcate their children with the same preferences. Furthermore, we incorporate an 
intragenerational learning externality which reduces the parents’ cost of indoctrinating 
their children when preferences for strong family ties are more widespread among the 
population.   
 Most of the existing literature (e.g., Bisin and Verdier 2001, 2008) identifies the 
oblique transmission – the process whereby young agents adopt a cultural trait from 
socialisation outside the family (e.g., imitation of role models) – as the key factor behind 
the impact of the distribution of different cultural traits on the vertical transmission that 
occurs inside the family. Our model identifies another mechanism as well: A higher 
population share of preferences for strong family ties influences the level of corruption 
which, in turn, affects the provision of public goods. The latter outcome affects the 
marginal utility of leisure, thus inducing parents to also adjust the amount of time they 
devote for the cultural indoctrination of their children.  
 The aforementioned outcomes have significant implications for the dynamic 
process of cultural transmission. Initially, we present a baseline scenario where the 
intragenerational learning externality is strong enough to neutralise the impact of the 
oblique transmission. In this case, the relation between strong family ties and the level of 
                                                 
1 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/12/06/corruption-hunters-rally-for-action-against-
fraud 
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corruption governs the dynamics of preferences in the sense that it determines if the 
population will be either culturally diverse, with regard to their preferences for weak or 
strong family ties, or culturally homogeneous due to the presence of path-dependence. 
Subsequently, we modify the model so that the intragenerational learning externality is 
not strong enough to offset the impact of the oblique transmission – a scenario where, in 
the absence of any relation between family ties and corruption, cultural indoctrination 
towards preferences for strong family ties would be decreasing in the share of the 
population who carry the same preferences. The main point of the influential work by 
Bisin and Verdier (2001) is that this type of cultural substitution rules out path-
dependence in the process of cultural transmission, thus ensuring a diverse long-run 
distribution of preferences among the population, in contrast to evolutionary selection 
mechanisms which are conducive to path-dependence and to some traits becoming 
dominant. In our model, however, when the strength of family ties is favourable to a 
higher level of corruption, the process of intergenerational cultural transmission may 
still generate path-dependent outcomes, even though the oblique transmission incites 
cultural substitution. This is simply due to the fact that the positive effect of family ties 
on the incidence of corruption sets in motion mechanisms that counteract, hence they 
enrich, the ones that are associated with cultural substitution.      
 All in all, our study makes two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it 
presents a systematic study of how the relation between conjugal family ties and the 
incidence of corruption governs the intergenerational transmission of distinct cultural 
traits regarding family values. Secondly, it utilises the family ties-corruption nexus to 
make a more general point about the dynamics of cultural transmission: In the presence 
of additional channels through which the distribution of preferences among the 
population determines how intensely parents socialise and indoctrinate their children, 
the process of cultural transmission can lead to path-dependent outcomes, even though 
the oblique transmission is a source of cultural substitution.     
 Since corruption is an important element of our theory, there is a point of 
comparison with the model of intergenerational transmission of attitudes on corruption 
by Hauk and Sáez-Martí (2002). In their framework, multiple equilibria may emerge 
even under cultural substitution, because of the strategic considerations that emanate 
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from the joint determination of the payoffs from corrupt behaviour and of the values 
that promote such behaviour. In our framework, the cultural transmission process 
involves the desired strength of family ties rather than attitudes to corruption. 
Furthermore, the source of path-dependence is also different: It is not related to aspects 
of coordination and expectations, but to the additional mechanisms that the family ties-
corruption nexus instigates during the process of cultural transmission.  
 The remainder of our study is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present 
empirical correlations that are consistent with the model’s main outcomes. Section 3 
presents a theoretical model of family ties and corruption, while Section 4 introduces 
and analyses the dynamics of cultural transmission, thus deriving the main implications 
regarding the adoption of preferences for strong family ties among the population. In 
Section 5 we conclude.         
 
2 Empirical Motivation   
Our theoretical model suggests that the relation between family ties and corruption is 
key in determining whether the dynamics of preferences for family ties will converge to 
a unique equilibrium, in terms of the distribution of such preferences among the 
population, or they will be path-dependent, meaning that the pre-existing distribution of 
preferences will determine the long-run equilibrium. In other words, the family ties-
corruption nexus has implications for either the convergence or the divergence with 
regard to the population distribution of family ties among different countries.  
To examine this implication empirically, we motivate our paper with evidence 
from the European Values Study (EVS) – a large-scale cross-national survey with four 
waves covering the 1981-2008 period. The use of the EVS is ideal for the purpose of our 
analysis for several reasons. First, it provides measures of family ties and of corruption 
that have been traditionally used in the literature. Second, given that our sample 
contains primarily European countries, the notion of family ties is rather comparable, 
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meaning that while there is variation in the strength of family ties across countries and 
over time, yet the concept of family ties is similar in the vast majority of these countries.2  
Our approach in examining empirically the implications of the theoretical 
framework is simple and intuitive. Using the aforementioned sample, we correlate 
graphically the initial value of the family ties variable with the growth rate of the same 
variable. As initial value we define the value of family ties in the first year of our sample, 
i.e., the mean value for each country during first available wave of the EVS (i.e., 1990-
1993 for our measure of family ties – see below). As the final value, we use the value 
derived from the fourth wave of the EVS. We illustrate this correlation for two groups of 
countries. The first group is a set of countries for which corruption and family ties 
correlate positively (Group A) while the second is a group of countries for which 
corruption and family ties correlate negatively (Group B). It should be noted that our 
motivating evidence does not aspire to be a fully-fledged empirical analysis; hence, the 
correlations we illustrate are unconditional correlations. 
We follow some benchmark studies (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Alesina et 
al. 2015) that use measures of family ties from the EVS. Our measure is derived from the 
question about how important is family for the respondent’s life. Answers vary from 1 
to 4 with ‘1’ indicating that family is not important at all and ‘4’ indicating that it is very 
important.3 With regard to the measure of corruption, we use two alternative proxies. 
The first proxy entails the response to the following question from the EVS: “How 
justifiable do you find it to accept a bribe?” The variable takes values from 1 to 10 with ‘1’ 
corresponding to “never” and ‘10’ corresponding to “always”. Thus a higher value of 
this variable is associated with more favourable views – and, therefore, a greater 
inclination – towards corruption. The second proxy is the standard Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) which takes values from 0 to 10, with higher values being 
indicative of higher levels of corruption.4 
                                                 
2 Our sample contains 24 countries. These are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. 
3 Note that in the original questionnaire, the family ties variable is measured in reverse order – high scores 
indicate reduced strength of family ties. To facilitate the analysis’ interpretation and to avoid confusion, we 
have reversed the original variable by using the transformations 5 χ , where χ  is the original score from 
the EVS.    
4 The CPI is available online at: 
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Figures 1.A and 1.B illustrate the correlation between the initial value and the 
growth rate of the family ties variable. What emerges is a positive (negative) correlation 
when we use data from countries in which the measures of family ties and corruption – 
in this case, the responses on the justifiability of bribery – correlate positively 
(negatively). The same implications are drawn from Figures 2.A and 2.B where we use 
the second proxy for corruption, i.e., the CPI. Naturally, the countries within Groups A 
and B differ between the two proxies of corruption – given that different measures 
encompass different aspects of corrupt behaviour and activities – however they overlap 
to a large extend. More importantly, both cases indicate the possible presence of forces 
that generate divergence (convergence) in the relative strength of family ties in countries 
where there is a positive (negative) relation between family ties and corruption. Our 
theoretical framework will present mechanisms that offer credence to this possibility.  
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Figure 1.A Group A of countries 
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Figure 1.B Group B of countries 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017?gclid=Cj0KCQiA-
4nuBRCnARIsAHwyuPpKlAiTreSsZnLuRHPDKBGhjXoR4KrQu3gpbPyl6X9Z5Qx-
tfcysngaAjRdEALw_wcB 
Similarly to our family ties variable, the original ranking is a reverse one. For this reason, our analysis 
reverses the measure using the transformation 10 χ , where χ  is the original score of the CPI. 
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Figure 2.A Group A of countries 
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Figure 2.B Group B of countries 
 
 
3 A Simple Model of Family Ties and Corruption   
The model in this section is based on Litina and Varvarigos (2018) who, in turn, draw on 
Alesina et al. (2015). Similar to these studies, the focus is on conjugal family ties that are 
mainly manifested through the locational preference of people who possess a desire to 
retain a strong bonding with their parents and their children.5  
Time is discrete and indexed by 0,1,2,...t  . Consider an infinite horizon 
economy populated by a sequence of overlapping generations of couples who have a 
lifespan of three periods. Henceforth, the three periods of a couple’s lifetime will be 
referred to as childhood, youth and old-age – the latter two being the periods of 
adulthood. The individuals who form a couple share the same preferences and make all 
their decisions jointly. There is no population growth since each couple gives birth to a 
couple, and so on. To save on notation, the population mass of couples is normalised to 
1. We shall be referring to couples as ‘agents’ hereafter.  
During childhood, agents adopt a cultural trait that will ultimately determine 
their desire to retain strong ties with their immediate family, i.e., with their parents and 
                                                 
5 Another implication of our attention to conjugal family ties is that we keep a tight focus on the closeness 
between family members when measuring the utility of those who have been inculcated with strong family 
ties. In other words, we do not consider other issues pertaining to extended family ties, which would entail 
additional considerations with regard to corruption (e.g., nepotism).    
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with their children, in adulthood. There are two such traits, indexed by { , }j s w . Type-
s  agents are those who have been inculcated with a preference for strong family ties; 
Type- w  agents are those who did not adopt such preferences. Let [0,1]tf   be the 
population share of young agents in time t  who have adopted preferences for 
maintaining close ties with their families. For the moment, tf  is taken as given. Later on, 
however, it will be treated as endogenous, since the distribution of cultural traits among 
the population will be determined through an explicit process of intergenerational 
transmission of preferences.  
Young agents earn income, enjoy the consumption of (private and public) goods, 
and rear their children. Nature distinguishes the individuals who form a couple 
according to their occupational characteristics. One of them is a producer of a private 
good. Appealing to the idea that there is a greater set of productive opportunities and a 
better skills matching for people who do not restrict their choices in terms of location, it 
is assumed that the private producer’s productivity is a function of the location in which 
agents decides to reside (e.g., Alesina et al. 2015). If agents are willing to move to any 
location away from their parents’ place of residence, private production will result in 
(1 )ω y  units of output with certainty, where , 0ω y  . If, however, agents restrict 
themselves in residing to the location of their parents, private production will result in 
the same amount of output, i.e., (1 )ω y , only with probability (0,1)π , whereas with 
probability 1 π  private production will generate only y  units of output.  
The other individual is employed as a civil servant in the public sector. In 
exchange for a salary 0B  , his role is to operate a project that transforms units of public 
funds into units of utility-enhancing public goods on a one-to-one basis. Nevertheless, 
the civil servant is corruptible in the sense that he may abuse his position and invest 
only a fraction (0,1)z  of the funds that the government allocates to him for the 
operation of the project, thus expropriating the remaining amount for his own benefit.6 
In the event that his wrongdoing is revealed, something that happens with probability 
,Μ [0,1]j t  , he faces financial penalties – i.e., the loss of his salary and of his ill-gotten 
gains – whereas he and his partner will also face a proportional loss of their utility when 
                                                 
6 Litina and Varvarigos (2018) delve deeper into the microfoundations of the civil servant’s misconduct.  
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young, as a result of the distress, stigma and shame that emanate from the revelation of 
his misconduct as well as from the punishment for it (e.g., dismissal from employment; 
imprisonment etc.). It is assumed that ,Μ j t  is uniformly distributed across all civil 
servants of the same type (i.e., { , }j s w ). Specifically,7 
 ,,
,
Μ j tj t
j t
μ
F ,  (1) 
where   
 , [0, ] if[0,1 ] if
t
j t
t
f j sμ f j w
  
,   , if1 if
t
j t
t
f j sF f j w
   
.  (2) 
As long as they have been inculcated with preferences for strong family ties, 
young agents will enjoy a utility gain from the decision to reside in the close vicinity of 
their parents. On the contrary, the decision to move away from their parents will result 
in a loss of utility. For agents who have not been inculcated with preferences for strong 
family ties, their choice of location will not generate any utility gain or loss per se.  
Given the characteristics of the model, the utility of young Type- j  agents can be 
expressed as  
 , ,( Φ )(1 )j t j t j tU c S a    , (3)   
where ta  is the amount of utility-enhancing public goods, ,j tc  denotes consumption of 
private goods, and  
 
if  and agents reside in their parents' location
Φ if  and agents reside away from their parents' location
0 if , irrespective of the agents' location
j
φ j s
φ j s
j w
   
 (4)        
such that 0φ  . The term S  quantifies the proportional loss in utility, due to the stigma, 
shame and punishment from the revelation of a corrupt civil servant’s misconduct.8 It is 
assumed that        
                                                 
7 This assumption follows Varvarigos (2017). It is meant to capture agents’ varying abilities in avoiding 
detection, either through their networking with people who can assist them towards this purpose, or by 
being vigilant and avoiding patterns of behaviour that would expose their excessive wealth.  
8 These deleterious effects do not impinge on the utility that emanates from the provision of public goods. 
This is a simple technical device to rule out strategic elements and issues of coordination from a civil 
servant’s decision to be either corrupt or remain honest. These would have complicated the analysis 
considerably, without adding anything of significance to our results.   
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(0,1) if the civil servant is corrupt, and is eventually revealed as such
0 if the civil servant is corrupt, but avoids detection
0 if the civil servant is honest
σ
S
 
 (5)        
All young agents pay a lump-sum tax 0T  . The government uses the revenues 
from taxation to finance the operation of the public sector – the civil servants’ salaries 
and the funds allocated to them, denoted G , for the delivery of public goods. To 
simplify the analysis, all items in the public budget are tied to the economy’s output, 
according to B by , G gy  and T τy , where , , (0,1)b g τ . It follows that the 
balanced-budget constraint can be expressed as 
 τ g b  .   (6) 
Taking account of the above, the quantity of public goods is given by 
 [1 Θ (1 )]t ta gy z   , (7)   
where Θ (0,1)t   is the number of civil servants (both Type- s  and Type- w  ones) who 
are corrupt.   
By virtue of (4) and the characteristics of private production, young agents who 
have not been inculcated with a desire to retain strong family ties (i.e., j w ), will 
optimally choose to move away from their parents’ location. Given this, let us combine 
(1)-(6) and consider a Type- w  civil servant. He will be corrupt as long as the agents’ 
expected utility from doing so, i.e., 
 , ,, 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )1 1
corrupt w t w t
w t t
t t
μ μU ω gz y ω g b y σ af f
             
,  (8) 
exceeds the agents’ utility in the scenario where he is honest, i.e.,  
 , (1 )honestw t tU ω g y a    . (9) 
Equating the utility functions in (8) and (9) yields the equilibrium number of corrupt 
Type- w  civil servants as 
 , (1 )w t w tμ θ f  ,  (10) 
where 
 (1 )(1 ) (1 )w
g zθ g z σ ω g b b
       .  (11) 
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Now, consider agents who have been inculcated with a preference for retaining 
strong ties with their families (i.e., j s ). Given (4) and the characteristics of private 
production, these agents may be willing to accept a loss of potential income, as long they 
can remain close to their parents. In this case, we can combine (1)-(6) to write Type- s  
agents’ utility – depending on whether the civil servant is honest or corrupt – as follows: 
 , (1 )honests t tU πω g y φ α     ,  (12) 
 , ,, 1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ](1 )corrupt s t s ts t t
t t
μ μU πω gz y φ πω g b y φ σ αf f
              
.  (13) 
Combining (1)-(6) once more, the corresponding expressions for the utility of Type- s  
agents who move away from their parents’ location are 
 , (1 )honests t tU ω g y φ α     ,  (14) 
 , ,, 1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ](1 )corrupt s t s ts t t
t t
μ μU ω gz y φ ω g b y φ σ αf f
              
.  (15) 
Similarly to Alesina et al. (2015), we adopt the following condition which ensures 
that Type- s  agents will always find optimal to reside close to their parents when they 
become adults:9 
 [ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ] ˆ2
g z π ω σ πω g b b yφ φσ
           (16) 
The condition in (16) implies that the highest possible utility attained when moving to a 
different location (i.e., Eq. 15 for , 0s tμ  ) falls short of the lowest possible utility attained 
when staying to the parent’s location (i.e., Eq. 13 for , 1s tμ  ). Consequently, the 
equilibrium number of corrupt Type- s  civil servants can be derived after equating (12) 
and (13). It follows that  
 ,s t s tμ θ f ,  (17) 
where  
 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )s
g zθ σφg z σ πω g b b y

      
.  (18) 
Combining the results in (10) and (17), we can determine the total number of 
corrupt civil servants  
                                                 
9 Evidence by Giuliano (2007) and Alesina and Giuliano (2010) supports this assumption.  
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 Θ (1 ) Θ( )t w t s t tθ f θ f f    ,  (19) 
which can be substituted in (7) to derive 
 {1 [ (1 ) ](1 )} ( )t w t s t ta gy θ f θ f z a f      . (20)   
Defining the composite term 
 (1 )φ π ωy  ,  (21) 
it is straightforward to combine (11) and (18)-(21) and establish that 
 0 ifΘ ( ) 0 ift
φ φf φ φ
   

 , 
0 if( ) 0 ift
φ φa f φ φ
   

 . (22) 
Given the above, the impact of a shift in the distribution of different family 
values – favouring strong family ties – on corruption is summarised in  
 
Proposition 1. Assuming that ˆφ φ  holds, an increase in the population share of people with a 
desire for strong family ties has an ambiguous (i.e., either positive or negative) effect on the 
incidence of corruption and, therefore, on the provision of public goods.   
 
Proof. It follows from the results in (22).   ■ 
  
There are two conflicting mechanisms that permeate the effect of family ties on 
the incidence of corruption. On the one hand, the ill-gotten gains of a civil servant’s 
misconduct are the means through which agents with preferences for strong family ties 
can counteract the possible income loss, incurred as a result of their desire to reside close 
to their parents, while relinquishing more productive opportunities elsewhere. On the 
other hand, these agents will face more detrimental consequences from the possible 
revelation and punishment of such misconduct, as the stigma, shame and anguish will 
also impinge on the enjoyment of being close to their parents. Obviously, a similar 
ambiguity applies to the effect of family ties on the delivery of public goods – corruption 
is, after all, a process whereby people who are involved with the public sector extract 
private rents at the expense of public goods’ provision.  
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4 The Evolution of Family Values 
So far, we have treated the distribution of preferences for either strong or weak family 
ties across the population as given. Hereafter, we relax this assumption. Instead, this 
distribution will become endogenous, as a result of a dynamic process of cultural 
transmission à la Bisin and Verdier (2001).  
Let us consider a scenario where agents have N  units of available leisure time at 
the beginning of their adulthood. The private good producer devotes (inelastically) 1 
unit of time to the production of goods. Similarly, the civil servant devotes (again, 
inelastically) 1 unit of time as a public sector employee. Therefore, agents are left with 
2N   units of available time, to be used for leisure activities, denoted ,j tn , and to 
undertake the cultural indoctrination of their children – if they have an incentive to do 
so.  
We shall assume that, in addition to their direct effect on utility, public goods 
increase the marginal utility of leisure as well. Indeed, publicly-funded amenities (e.g., 
parks, roads, beaches, libraries, museums etc.) can enhance the enjoyment of various 
leisure activities. To minimise the technical complexity of the model, however, we also 
assume that leisure activities, and the utility accruing from them, are not subject to the 
deleterious effects of stigma and anguish, in the event that the civil servant’s 
malversation is revealed. We justify this assumption by appealing to the idea that leisure 
time offers to agents the opportunity to avoid the intrusion and condemnation from 
other people who are aware of the civil servant’s wrongdoing.  
Young agents who wish to instil a preference for strong family ties in their 
children, can do so by means of a process of cultural indoctrination. Specifically, they 
need to devote ,( , ) 0j t tk e f   units of time – where (0, ) 0tk f  , , , ,, 0j t j t j te e ek k   and , 0j t te fk   
– to achieve a probability , [0,1]j te   of successfully inculcating their children with a 
desire to retain strong family ties. It follows that leisure time is given by  
 , ,2 ( , )j t j t tn N k e f   . (23)  
Note that the effect of tf  on ( )k   captures the scenario whereby an increased 
number of people who have preferences for strong family ties, expands the set of 
experiences with regard to the process that induced them to adopt this cultural trait 
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when they, themselves, were in childhood. These experiences generate a positive 
learning externality, as the process of social interactions allows parents to share such 
experiences, thus facilitating them in their efforts to instil similar cultural traits in their 
own children. Evidence on the positive learning externalities that emanate from social 
interactions is provided by Goolsbee and Klenow (2002), whereas other studies (e.g., 
Riley 1990; Cochran and Niego 2002) argue that social networks enable parents to adopt 
and improve their parenting practices through information sharing or through advice 
and discussions on childrearing.   
In the event that the parents’ efforts are not successful, i.e., with probability 
,1 j te , their children may still assume a desire for strong family ties through the oblique 
transmission, i.e., with probability ( ) [0,1]j tm f   ( 0m  ). This is meant to capture the 
idea that children in time t  will adopt the cultural values and norms of role models 
whom they pick out of their interactions with the existing population of adults. 
Following Bisin and Verdier (2001), we assume that for agents who grow up with Type-
s  parents – i.e., parents who adopted a preference for strong family ties when they, 
themselves, were in their childhood – the oblique transmission is characterised by 
 ( )s t tm f f .  (24) 
Nevertheless, we also follow Sáez-Martí and Sjögren (2008) in assuming that for 
agents who grow up with Type- w  parents – i.e., parents who did not adopt a preference 
for strong family ties when they, themselves, were in childhood – this probability falls 
short of the population share of young agents who possess the Type- s  trait. Formally, 
we consider a parameter (0,1)m  such that  
 ( )w t t tm f mf f  ,  (25) 
In general, this idea derives from what Sáez-Martí and Sjögren (2008) term as ‘negative 
bias’ towards a cultural trait. In the context of our model, this may indicate that, on the 
outset, those who grow up in a Type- w  household have a negative predisposition 
against cultural values and norms with which they are not directly familiar through 
their immediate family.10  
                                                 
10 Sáez-Martí and Sjögren (2008) provide explicit microfoundations behind the positive or negative bias 
towards cultural traits. 
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Earlier, the expression in (4) described how different types of family values affect 
the utility of young agents, with regard to their choice of staying close to their parents, 
or moving away from them. Here, this expression also underlies the reason why agents 
may wish to devote the effort to induce their offspring into the adoption of strong family 
ties. As long as they are of Type- s , thus abiding by similar family values, they will enjoy 
a utility gain 0φ   when old, if their (adult) children decide to stay in their vicinity, 
whereas a utility loss of φ  will apply if their children move away when they reach 
adulthood. Type- w  agents, who do not have a desire for strong family ties, experience 
neither a utility gain nor a utility loss when old, as a result of their children’s choice of 
location. Immediately, this reveals that, by virtue of , 0w tek  , Type- w  agents will not 
devote any effort in instilling a preference for strong family ties in their offspring, i.e., 
, 0w te  , simply because they will not get any utility benefit from doing so. Recall that 
the motivation behind the parents’ desire to instil their own family values in their 
children, is the utility that parents, themselves, may enjoy in the event that their children 
reside close to them when they reach adulthood. It is for this reason that Type- w  agents 
do not try to transmit their own values in their children; they simply have no incentive 
to do so.11 It follows that , 2w tn N   and, therefore, their utility will be either  
  , , ,( )corrupt corruptw t w t t w tV U X a n ,  (26) 
or 
  , , ,( )honest honestw t w t t w tV U X a n .  (27) 
The term ( )tX a  is an increasing function, which captures the positive effect of public 
goods on the marginal utility of leisure, and for which we specify 
 ( )t tX a x a  ,   0x  .   (28) 
                                                 
11 This may appear different from other research work on cultural transmission where parents obey to some 
sort of paternalistic altruism, in the sense that they have the subjective belief that their children will be better-
off if they adopt their own cultural characteristics. Here, conjugal family ties are associated with a more 
selfish motive – parents with a preference for strong family ties want their children to be close to them, 
whereas parents with no such preferences are simply indifferent, as their locational proximity to (or 
remoteness from) their children bears no impact on their utility. It should be noted that, depending on the 
preference trait under investigation, existing studies on cultural transmission have also deviated from the 
idea of paternalistic altruism. For example, Sáez-Martí and Sjögren (2008) consider a scenario where the 
vertical transmission is attributed to parents’ pure altruism towards their children, after they outline a host 
of examples where this may apply (e.g., attitudes to education; eating habits etc.).      
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Note that the actual expressions for ,corruptw tU  and ,honestw tU  are given in (8) and (9) 
respectively, depending on the conduct of civil servants. Together with (26) and (27), 
they reveal that the decisions by Type- w  agents will be the same as in Section 2, 
meaning that the results in Eq. (10)-(11) still hold.  
Before we proceed, it should be noted that the lack of consumption expenditures 
in old age is adopted for mathematical convenience and for avoiding the use of 
excessive notation. It does not necessarily affect our main results and implications. For 
example, consider a case where the utility function’s consumption component is 


1
, , 1
ρ ρ
j t j tc c  where , 1j tc  is consumption in old age. Furthermore, consider the presence of a 
technology that allows the storage of goods on a one-to-one basis. In this case, agents 
would choose to consume a fixed fraction 1 ρ  of their total income when young, while 
storing the remaining fraction ρ  for consumption when old. What is important is that, 
in equilibrium, the term  1, , 1ρ ρj t j tc c  would be linear in young agents’ income, thus leaving 
subsequent calculations and results mostly unaffected in comparison to what we present 
in this study. A similar argument applies to the impact of public goods on old agents’ 
utility: We could have added a utility term 1( )tν a  (   0ν ) to capture this impact. As 
long as agents take the quantity of public goods as given, something that is indeed true 
in our model, this added term would have no bearing on our existing results  
Now, we shall turn our attention to Type- s  agents and define , 1s tQ   as the 
probability that their children will reside close to them when they reach adulthood. 
Therefore, given a discount factor (0,1)ρ , the agents’ utility – depending on their own 
location and on whether the civil servant decides to either behave honestly or to seek 
private rents through corruption – will be either12   
       , , , , 1 , 1( ) [ (1 )( )]honest honests t s t t s t s t s tV U X α n ρ Q φ Q φ ,  (29) 
or 
       , , , , 1 , 1( ) [ (1 )( )]corrupt corrupts t s t t s t s t s tV U X α n ρ Q φ Q φ ,  (30) 
                                                 
12 The utility component regarding family values, during the Type- s  agents’ old age, is not affected by the 
stigma and anguish that stem from the revelation of a civil servant’s misconduct. Therefore, there is an 
implicit assumption that the utility cost of being revealed as a fraudster dissipates over time – it applies only 
to the period where the misconduct was actually revealed, i.e., during the agents’ youth. Furthermore, note 
that, similar to Type- w  agents, they also enjoy utility from public goods when old.   
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The expressions in (29)-(30) reveal that the agents’ choice regarding leisure, as 
well as their probability that their adult children will stay close to them, are not affected 
by their own location. Consequently, the condition in (16) is still sufficient to ensure that 
all agents who have a desire to retain strong family ties will reside in their parents’ 
location once they reach adulthood. In other words, ,honests tU  and ,corrupts tU  are given in (12) 
and (13) respectively. Another implication of the condition in (6) is that , 1s tQ   is also the 
probability that Type- s  agents’ children will adopt a preference for strong family ties. 
That is,  
 , 1 , ,(1 ) ( )s t s t s t s tQ e e m f    . (31) 
In order to derive analytical results, we need a specific functional form for the 
parental effort component ,( , )s t tk e f . With the purpose of clarifying the mechanisms that 
permeate the dynamics of cultural transmission, we shall consider two different 
specifications regarding this effort component. The first one will act as a baseline 
scenario that, in the absence of corruption, strips away any direct cultural substitution – 
i.e., circumstances where the optimal choice for ,s te  is decreasing in tf . The second one 
will bring our framework closer to the convention of the existing literature, as the 
presence of cultural substitution will, in the absence of corruption, make the optimal 
choice for ,s te  decreasing in tf . As we shall see, however, the indirect effects that 
emanate from the impact of family ties on corruption – effects that are summarised in 
Proposition 1 – will enrich the outcomes and implications in both these cases.      
 
4.1 A Baseline Scenario 
Consider the following specification:  
 2, ,( , ) (1 )s t t t s tk e f κ f e  ,  (32) 
where 1κ  . To guarantee that leisure time is non-negative, we also assume that 
2N κ  . Using either (29) or (30), we can substitute (23), (24), (28), (31) and (32) to 
derive ,
,
0s t
s t
V
e
   and, therefore, obtain the optimal choice for ,s te  as 
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 , ( )s t t
ρφe κ x a  , (33) 
where, given (7), it is assumed that ( ) /ρ κ x gyz φ   in order to ensure that , 1s te  . As 
we can see, the choice in (33) is independent of the possibility that the agents’ resources 
may be augmented by the civil servants’ ill-gotten gains. Therefore, equating the utility 
functions in (29) and (30) will yield the same result with regard to the number of corrupt 
Type- s  civil servants, as in Eq. (17)-(18).  
As a means of understanding the impact of corruption on the process of cultural 
transmission, let us disregard the result of Proposition 1 for a moment and, instead, 
consider a case where the distribution of different preferences for family ties among the 
population does not affect corruption at all. Formally, this is a case where Θ( ) Θ t tf f   
and, therefore, ( )  t ta f a f  . In these circumstances, the extent to which the population 
endorses values and norms that are conducive to strong family ties does not have a direct 
effect on the parents’ efforts to instil similar values and norms in their children, i.e., 
, / 0s t te f   . The reason is that tf  has two conflicting effects on the optimal effort 
towards cultural indoctrination. On the one hand, a higher tf  increases the likelihood 
that agents will adopt a preference for strong family ties through the oblique 
transmission, thus reducing the parents’ incentives to incur the reduction in leisure 
necessary to achieve the same outcome. On the other hand, a higher tf  reduces the 
marginal effort cost of inculcating children with a desire to maintain strong family ties, 
due to the positive learning spillovers to which we alluded earlier. Under the 
specification in Eq. (32), these two effects cancel each other out.  
Nonetheless, the distribution of preferences for family ties does have an effect on 
corruption as we know from Proposition 1. Given this, any change in the distribution of 
cultural traits among the population will have an indirect effect on cultural 
indoctrination. To see this, use (20) to rewrite (33) as 
 , ( )[ ( )]s t s tt
ρφe e fκ x α f  , (34) 
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an expression that allows us to infer the result in13  
 
Proposition 2. When preferences for strong family ties become more widespread among the 
population, parents will intensify their efforts to inculcate their children with a desire to retain 
strong family ties, as long as the prevalence of this cultural trait increases the incidence of 
corruption. Otherwise, parents will moderate their efforts to instil a desire for strong family ties 
in their children.    
 
Proof. Combining (22) and (34), we can establish that    
 2
0 if Θ ( ) 0( )( ) 0 if Θ ( ) 0[ ( )]
tt
s t
tt
φ φ fρφα fe f φ φ fκ x α f
           

 ,   
thus completing the proof.   ■   
 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 stems from the fact that an increase in the 
incidence of corruption, i.e., a higher Θt , leads to a decline in the overall delivery of 
public goods. Consequently, it reduces the marginal utility of leisure, hence motivating 
parents to allocate more time towards their children’s cultural indoctrination. As we 
have already established, a shift in the distribution of preferences regarding the strength 
of family ties will have an ambiguous effect on corruption. Given the manner through 
which utility-enhancing public goods affect the marginal utility of leisure, this 
ambiguity permeates the effect of tf  on the parents’ efforts to inculcate their offspring 
with preferences that are conducive to strong family ties.  
The important message from the preceding analysis is that – in the context of this 
framework – the level of corruption is the underlying cause behind Type- s  parents’ 
incentives to change the level of their children’s cultural indoctrination, whenever the 
family values which they, themselves, uphold become more widespread among the 
population. In essence, this outcome reveals that the impact of family values on 
corruption may feed back to the very process through which these values are diffused in 
the first place. It is exactly for this reason that our equilibrium outcomes echo the ideas 
                                                 
13 In the particular case where 1tf  , it is , 1 1s tQ    as well. Thus, a more accurate characterisation of the 
result in (34) is ( ) (0,1)s te f   for [0,1)tf   and ( ) 0s te f   for 1tf  .    
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of cultural complementarity and cultural substitution in the work of Bisin and Verdier 
(2001, 2008). Similar to their work, this process may have important implications for the 
dynamics of preferences regarding the strength of family ties. In order to analyse these 
dynamics, note that the evolution of the number of agents who have preferences for 
strong family ties is given by  
   1 , ,1 ( ) ( )(1 )t s t s t s t t w t tf e e m f f m f f        .  (35) 
According to (35), a fraction   , ,1 ( )s t s t s te e m f   of children born to agents with 
an inclination towards strong family ties, of whom there are tf , will adopt similar 
preferences. Agents who do not have any inclination towards strong family ties, of 
whom there are 1 tf , will not devote any effort towards their children’s adoption of 
such preferences. Nonetheless, a fraction ( )w tm f  of people born to these agents will still 
adopt a desire for strong family ties. This is because the fact that Type- w  parents do not 
devote any effort to instil a sense of family bonding in their children, does not 
necessarily mean that people, born to these parents, will not adopt such preferences. On 
the contrary, they may still adopt a desire for strong family ties through the oblique 
transmission and, therefore, enjoy utility from residing close to their family, even 
though their parents are indifferent about their offspring’s choice of location.  
Substituting (24), (25) and (34) in (35), the latter expression can be rewritten as   
 1 [( ( ) )(1 ) ] ( )t t s t t t tf f e f m f f λ f      ,  (36) 
such that  
 ( ) ( ( ) ( ))(1 ) [2 ( ( ) )]t s t t s t t t s tλ f e f m f e f f f e f m         . (37) 
From Eq. (36) we can see that  0Lf   and  1Hf   are steady state solutions since both of 
them are consistent with 1t tf f  . Moreover, Eq. (36) may be consistent with another, 
interior steady state solution  (0,1)Mf   that solves   1s Me f m  . In what follows, we 
shall assume that the conditions under which the interior steady state exists hold. Given 
this, we summarise our results in  
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Lemma 1. Assume that ˆφ φ  holds and recall that ˆφ φ . When three steady state equilibria 
 0Lf  ,  (0,1)Mf   and  1Hf   exist, then: 
i. If φ φ  , Lf  and  Hf  are locally asymptotically stable, whereas Mf  is unstable. 
ii. If φ φ  , Mf  is asymptotically stable, whereas Lf  and  Hf  are unstable.   
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   ■ 
 
The main implication from Lemma 1 can be elucidated through  
 
Proposition 3. Let 0 (0,1)f   be the initial share of the population with preferences for strong 
family ties:  
i. As long as family ties increase the incidence of corruption, the population will be 
culturally homogeneous in the long-run, as the distribution of preferences is sensitive to 
0f . Particularly, the population will be gradually dominated by people who desire to 
retain strong ties with their families if 0 Mf f , whereas the population will be gradually 
dominated by people who do not have such a desire if 0 Mf f . 
ii. As long as family ties reduce the incidence of corruption, the distribution of preferences is 
not sensitive to 0f . Specifically, the population will be culturally diverse with regard to 
their preferences on the strength of family ties, as the distribution of preferences will 
converge to  (0,1)Mf   in the long-run.   
 
Proof. It follows from (22) and Lemma 1.   ■ 
  
The previous result reveals that, when strong family ties are responsible for 
increased corruption, the long-run equilibrium is path-dependent (see the phase 
diagram in Figure 3). In other words, if the share of the population with either strong or 
weak preferences for retaining close ties with their families – parents and children – is 
high enough, then this situation is more likely to persist over time and such attitudes 
will eventually dominate in the long-run. The intuition rests primarily with the fact that 
corruption generates a complementarity between cultural indoctrination by parents and 
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the share of Type- s  agents in the population. Particularly, the presence of a large (small) 
number of people with preferences for strong family ties will induce Type- s  parents to 
devote more (less) time inculcating their offspring with similar attitudes, thus 
stimulating a further increase (decrease) of the population who abide by these family 
values. At the same time, more (less) young people born to Type- w  agents will actually 
adopt the Type- s  cultural trait through the oblique transmission. These mechanisms are 
conducive to path-dependence, hence the outcome in the first part of Proposition 3. On 
the contrary, when strong family ties are favourable to reduced corruption, the long-run 
equilibrium is unique (see the phase diagram in Figure 4). Here, the corruption-induced 
mechanism that imbues the relation between cultural indoctrination and the population 
share of Type- s  agents implies that this population share will be gradually increasing if 
tf  is relatively low, but gradually decreasing if tf  is relatively high.        
1tf   
tf  
( )tλ f  
 0Lf   Mf   1Hf   
 
 Figure 3. The dynamics of preferences for family ties when Θ ( ) 0tf  . 
 0Lf     1Hf    Mf   t
f   
1tf 
( )tλ f   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 4. The dynamics of preferences for family ties when Θ ( ) 0tf  . 
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4.2 An Extended Scenario 
In the baseline version of the previous section, the distribution of family values across 
the population affected the intensity of cultural indoctrination towards strong family ties 
indirectly, i.e., solely through the effect of this distribution on the incidence of corruption. 
This was because the learning externality embedded in the function ,( , )s t tk e f  worked in 
such a way so that the two conflicting direct effects of tf  on ,s te  cancelled each other out. 
The purpose of this section is to relax this assumption and examine the model’s results 
and implications in a setting which is qualitatively closer to the existing literature on 
cultural transmission, in the sense that – excluding any considerations regarding the 
impact of family ties on corruption – cultural indoctrination will be a cultural substitute 
to the population share of people who uphold preferences for strong family ties. In other 
words, for given quantity of public goods, tf  will have a negative direct effect on ,s te .   
Let us replace Eq. (32) with the modified effort function  
 2, ,( , ) ( )(1 )s t t t t s tk e f κ f f e   ,  (38) 
where 2,( 1 2 ) 0tf t s tk κ f e      by virtue of 1κ  . In the same way as before, the learning 
externality still facilitates Type- s  parents in instilling a desire for strong family ties in 
their children. Nevertheless, solving the couple’s problem under the effort function in 
(38), yields  
 , ( )( )[ ( )]s t s tt t
ρφe e fκ f x α f   .  (39) 
In contrast to the corresponding solution in Eq. (34), now we can see that if we 
disregard the result in Proposition 1 for a moment and, instead, consider a case where 
Θ( ) Θ t tf f   and ( )  t ta f a f  , the parents’ efforts to instil a desire for strong family ties 
in their children is decreasing in the population share of young agents who possess this 
behavioural trait. This is because the oblique transmission, through which a higher tf  
increases the likelihood that children will adopt a preference for strong family ties, 
dominates the effect of the learning externality in the determination of cultural 
indoctrination by Type- s  parents. Consequently, a higher tf  induces parents to devote 
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less effort towards the indoctrination of their offspring. As we argued previously, this 
type of cultural substitution is (in qualitative terms) the outcome that emerges in the 
majority of existing theoretical work on cultural transmission (e.g., Bisin and Verdier 
2001; Hauk and Sáez-Martí 2002; Michau 2013; Klasing 2014). In this case, similar to the 
influential work of Bisin and Verdier (2001), the dynamics of cultural transmission are 
qualitatively identical to those depicted on the phase diagram of Figure 4, as we argue in  
 
Corollary 1. When the relative strength of family ties does not have any effect on the incidence of 
corruption, the dynamics of intergenerational transmission converge to an interior long-run 
distribution of cultural traits that is not sensitive to the initial distribution of these traits among 
the population. In other words, the population will be culturally diverse with regard to their 
preferences on family values, due to the direct effect of cultural substitution.  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   ■    
  
In our framework, however, the prevalence of strong family ties has implications 
for corruption. In order to analyse the outcomes that transpire under such 
circumstances, let us define the function 
 ( ) ( )[ ( )]t t tr f κ f x α f   .  (40) 
Using (20) and (40), it is straightforward to establish that  
 1 2( ) Ω Ω ( 2 )t tr f κ f    , (41) 
where 
 1Ω [1 (1 )]wx gy θ z    , 2Ω ( )(1 )s wgy θ θ z     (42) 
are composite terms such that 1 2Ω Ω . From (39)-(40), it follows that  
 2( )( ) [ ( )]
t
s t
t
ρφr fe f r f
  .  (43) 
Note that the dynamics of cultural traits are still given by Eq. (36). Once more, we 
shall focus our attention in circumstances where, in addition to   0Lf   and  1Hf  , there 
exist interior equilibria, such that 1 ˆ (0,1)t tf f f    . Formally, the possible outcomes 
are presented in  
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Lemma 2. Assume that ˆφ φ  holds and recall that ˆφ φ . When interior equilibria exist, then: 
i. If either φ φ   or φ φ   and 1 2Ω /Ω 2κ  , there exist three steady state equilibria 
 0Lf  ,  (0,1)Mf   and  1Hf  . Mf  is asymptotically stable, whereas Lf  and Hf  are 
unstable. 
ii. If φ φ   and 1 2Ω /Ω κ , there exist three steady state equilibria  0Lf  ,  (0,1)Mf   and 
 1Hf  . Lf  and Hf  are locally asymptotically stable, whereas Mf  is unstable. 
iii. If φ φ   and 1 22 Ω /Ωκ κ   , there exist four steady state equilibria  0Lf  , 
 ,1 ,20 1M Mf f    and  1Hf  . ,1Mf  and Hf  are locally asymptotically stable, whereas 
Lf  and ,2Mf  are unstable.  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   ■ 
 
In terms of the cultural evolution of preferences for family ties among the 
population, we present the implications in  
 
Proposition 4. Let 0 (0,1)f   be the initial share of the population with preferences for strong 
family ties:  
i. When family ties reduce the incidence of corruption, the long-run distribution of 
preferences among the population is never sensitive to 0f . In the long-run, the 
population will be culturally diverse with regard to their preferences on the strength of 
family ties. 
ii. When family ties increase the incidence of corruption, there are circumstances where the 
long-run distribution of preferences among the population is sensitive to 0f . Whether the 
population will be culturally homogeneous (i.e., dominated by people with preferences for 
either weak or strong family ties) or diverse depends on the initial distribution of 
preferences.     
 
Proof. It follows from (22) and Lemma 2.   ■ 
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Under some circumstances, the impact of family ties on corruption does not alter 
the cultural evolution of family values among the population, in comparison to the 
outcomes that are summarised in Corollary 1. These are circumstances where cultural 
indoctrination is decreasing in the population share of agents who uphold values 
conducive to strong family ties, either because such family values mitigate the incidence 
of corruption, thus reinforcing the direct negative impact of tf  on ( )s te f , or because the 
latter effect dominates any positive impact of family ties on corruption. In other words, 
the dynamics of cultural transmission look identical to the phase diagram of Figure 4.    
 
1tf   
tf  
( )tλ f  
 0Lf    ,1Mf   ,2Mf    1Hf    
 
 
Figure 5. The dynamics of preferences for family ties when ( )s te f  is non-monotonic 
 
 
Nevertheless, there are other circumstances, which are summarised in parts (ii)-
(iii) of Lemma 2 and part (ii) of Proposition 4, where the cultural evolution of family 
values leads to outcomes that are sensitive to the initial distribution of these values 
among the population. These may occur when strong family ties prompt an increase in 
the level of corruption. One possibility is that the dynamics look identical to the ones 
depicted on the phase diagram of Figure 3. In this case, despite the fact that – in the 
absence of corruption – there is a mechanism that induces some sort of substitution 
between cultural indoctrination and the number of agents who are favourable to strong 
family ties, the reinforcing effect of family ties on corruption is strong enough to reverse 
this relation completely, thus generating the mechanism that is ultimately responsible 
for the emergence of path-dependent outcomes. Another possibility is illustrated on the 
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phase diagram of Figure 5. In this case, the cultural substitution that imbues the relation 
between indoctrination and the share of the population with preferences for strong 
family ties dominates for relatively low values of tf , but is dominated for relatively high 
values of tf . Consequently, ,2Mf  acts as a threshold that determines whether 
preferences for strong family ties will become dominant, or the population will be 
culturally diverse in the long-run.   
The preceding analysis and results have revealed the outcomes that we present 
formally in 
 
Corollary 2. When family ties prompt an increase in corruption, the dynamics of 
intergenerational transmission converge to a long-run distribution of cultural traits that may be 
sensitive to the initial distribution of these traits among the population, despite the direct effect of 
cultural substitution. In other words, the impact of family ties on corruption renders the initial 
distribution of preferences for family ties critical in circumstances where this initial distribution 
would be otherwise irrelevant.  
 
Proof. It follows from the preceding analysis and discussion.   ■   
 
Overall, we have demonstrated that the results and implications of our original 
framework can survive in a modified version, where, due to the strength of the oblique 
transmission, the prevalence of a cultural trait across the population is a substitute to 
parents’ incentives in inculcating their children with the same trait. Our analysis 
highlights the point that the presence of additional, indirect mechanisms – in our case, 
the incidence of corruption – through which the distribution of cultural traits can affect 
the dynamic process of cultural transmission can enrich the possible outcomes that 
emerge from this process. Indeed, the way through which corruption and family ties 
become interdependent, determines the dynamics of preferences for family ties across 
the population.  
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5 Conclusions 
The objective of this study was twofold. Firstly, to investigate the role of the family ties-
corruption nexus for the intergenerational transmission of preferences regarding the 
relative strength of conjugal family ties. Secondly, to use the results as a platform for 
extracting more general implications about the mechanisms that permeate the process of 
cultural transmission, as well as the long-run outcomes regarding the distribution of 
preferences and cultural traits among the population. We showed that when family ties 
decrease the incidence of corruption, then the time that parents devote for instilling a 
desire for strong family ties in their children is decreasing in the share of the population 
who have similar preferences for strong family ties. In this case, the dynamics of cultural 
transmission converge to a unique, interior equilibrium indicative of cultural diversity 
with regard to the distribution of different family values among the population. We also 
showed that when family ties increase the incidence of corruption, then the time that 
parents devote for inculcating their children with a desire to retain strong family ties is 
increasing in the share of the population who have similar preferences. In this scenario, 
the dynamics of cultural transmission may lead to path-dependent outcomes:  Whether 
one of the cultural traits (i.e., weak or strong family ties) will be uniformly adopted in 
the long-run, or the population will be culturally diverse, depends on the current 
distribution of preferences for family ties among the population. Interestingly, the 
relation between family ties and corruption sets in motion mechanisms that may lead to 
path-dependence and cultural homogeneity, even though the oblique transmission is a 
cultural substitute of parents’ cultural indoctrination of their children.  
 Our study concentrated on conjugal family ties, therefore it kept a tight focus on 
factors such as bonding, attentiveness and closeness among members of the immediate 
family as a means of capturing the strength of family ties. Nevertheless, once we expand 
our view of family ties to the extended family, we can identify additional factors that 
seem pertinent to corruption. One such factor is nepotism. For example, imagine a 
framework where the probability of securing employment in the public sector, and 
therefore having greater opportunities for rent-seeking through corruption, is increased 
when there are close ties with family members who are employed in the public sector. 
This is a framework that can certainly generate interesting mechanisms on the relation 
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between (extended) family ties and corruption, as well as on the dynamics of preference 
transmission regarding the relative strength of these ties. This is a research endeavour 
that is certainly worth pursuing in the future.      
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Substituting  0Lf   and  1Hf   in (37) yields  
 (0) (0)sλ e m   , (1) 2 (1)sλ e m    . (A1) 
Now write (36) in terms of the growth rate   
 1 ( )1 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )t t t t t
t t
f λ f f ς f ψ ff f
       ,  (A2) 
where  
 ( ) ( ) (1 )t s tς f e f m   . (A3) 
First consider the case where φ φ  , meaning that ( ) 0s te f  , and assume that 
(0) 1 (1)s se m e   . It follows that there exists  (0,1)Mf   such that    0 0M Mς f ψ f    
and, by virtue of (A3),  ( ) 0 0t Mς f ς f    . From (A2), we can derive  
 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )t t t tψ f ς f f ς f     ,  (A4) 
and substitute  (0,1)Mf   to deduce that this is not a stable steady state because 
       1 0 1M M M Mψ f f ς f λ f       . However, combining (0) 1 (1)s se m e    with 
(A1) reveals that  0Lf   and  1Hf   are stable steady state equilibria because 
(0), (1) (0,1)λ λ   .  
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Now consider the case where φ φ  , meaning that ( ) 0s te f  , and assume that 
(1) 1 (0)s se m e   . Once more, there exists  (0,1)Mf   such that    0 0M Mς f ψ f   . 
In this case, however, (A3) reveals that  ( ) 0 0t Mς f ς f    . From (A2), we can infer 
that  (0,1)Mf   is a stable steady state because        1 0 1M M M Mψ f f ς f λ f       . 
Furthermore, we can use (1) 1 (0)s se m e    with (A1) to reveal that  0Lf   and  1Hf   
are unstable because (0), (1) 1λ λ   .   ■    
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
When ( )  t ta f a f  , Eq. (39) becomes ( ) ( )( )s t t
ρφe f κ f x α   , meaning that ( ) 0s te f  . 
Therefore, we can appeal to the proof of Lemma 1 (for the case where ( ) 0s te f  ) to 
complete this proof as well.   ■    
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
If either s wφ φ θ θ    or s wφ φ θ θ    and 1 2Ω /Ω 2κ  , then (41)-(43) reveal that 
( ) 0s te f  . If s wφ φ θ θ    and 1 2Ω /Ω κ , then (41)-(43) reveal that ( ) 0s te f  . 
Therefore, we can appeal to the proof of Lemma 1 to provide the proof for parts (i) and 
(ii) of Lemma 2 as well.  
Now, consider φ φ   and 1 22 Ω /Ωκ κ   . Under this scenario, (41)-(43) reveal 
that              
 0 if( ) 0 if
t
s t
t
f fe f f f
   

  , (A5) 
where 1 2[(Ω /Ω ) ]/2f κ 
 . As long as  (0), (1) 1s s se e m e f     holds, there are actually 
four steady state equilibria  0Lf  ,  ,1 ,2, (0,1)M Mf f   such that  ,1 ,2M Mf f , and  1Hf  . By 
virtue of (A2), (A3) and (A5), the dynamics of tf  are characterised by    
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 
  
 
,1
1
,1 ,2
,2
0 if 0,
1 0 if ,
0 if ,1
t M
t
t M M
t
t M
f f
f f f ff
f f

    
,  (A6) 
hence revealing that the equilibria Lf  and ,2Mf  are unstable, whereas ,1Mf  and Hf  are 
locally asymptotically stable.14   ■    
 
 
 
                                                 
14 In this scenario, multiple equilibria can also emerge if (0) 1 (1)s se m e    or (0) 1 (1)s se m e   . In the 
former case, the interior equilibrium is unstable; in the latter case, it is stable. 
